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Abstract 
In modern corporations, the Operations Manager’s role in defining of firm’s strategy is 
becoming more important. In this paper we describe how firms can use this tendency for 
Operations Managers to make strategic decisions as a mechanism to prevent inventory 
mismanagement. These managers have incentives to speculate with inventory cost 
reductions, thereby avoiding sharp reductions in a single period, because it would hinder 
further reductions in the future. Remarkably, firms may prevent such behavior by stimulating 
the Operations Managers’ strategic orientation, without losing sight of inventory-efficient 
management. 
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1/ INTRODUCTION 
Operations decisions are playing an increasingly important role in a firm’s overall 
strategy to achieve competitive advantage. This is not surprising, as Wild (1979) emphasized 
a long time ago, “Operations managers' decisions influence the entire organization, the jobs 
within it, and the manner in which the whole is managed”. White and Wharton (1990) surveys 
900 US manufacturing firms and gives a score of 5.39 for production on a scale from 0 to 7, 
thus considering it as a significant element in a corporate strategy. These features lead 
Armistead and Mapes (1992) to conclude that operations managers' roles are likely to be 
more focused on corporate targets than on performance measures for manufacturing. A 
consequence follows: these managers should move their focus from production planning, 
scheduling and control (Gerwin, 1993), to coordination tasks (i.e connecting production and 
marketing, Nie and Young, 1997; or to design and coordinate networks of knowledge, Mak 
and Ramaprasad, 2003).  
However, this process of gaining more “managerial skills” (Oakland and Sohal, 1989) 
is far from a reality. As D’Netto and Sohal (1999) cites, “the UK’s operations managers were 
seen as mechanics with dirty finger nails, rather than gentlemen”, and their orientation is 
mainly cost focused rather than strategic oriented (Hum and Leow, 1992). Interestingly, this is 
in sharp contrast to the potential capabilities of these managers. D’Netto and Sohal (1999) 
shows, making use of a sample of Australian firms, that current Operations Managers are 
academically well-qualified in order to undertake staff supervision functions. This leads these 
authors to argue that Operations Managers in the future should have a greater role to play in 
setting the strategic direction of the company and defining priorities. 
Along this line, our main objective in this paper is to investigate whether Operations 
Managers’ involvement in activities not directly related to operational management, like the 
definition of a firms’ strategy, may affect detrimentally their time and effort devoted to 
managing inventory in a context where these managers have incentives to behave 
opportunistically. As a consequence, inventory policy may not be optimum. We intend to 
prove that this is not true. 
We approach this problem by developing a simple model, where Operations Managers 
are compensated when they achieve two complementary goals. First, when there is a reduction 
in inventory costs. And second, when they dedicate efforts to other activities not directly 
related to operations. These efforts are devoted, for example, to designing a knowledge 
supply network. This is a network that integrates manufacturing, distribution, engineering, 
technology deployment, marketing and customer services. OMs are especially able to 
coordinate these different sources of knowledge as the operational routines needed are quite 
familiar to them. This reinforces a firm’s strategy by ensuring efficient delivery of end 
products and services to markets (Mak and Ramaprasad, 2003). Also, these efforts can be 
spent in analysing outside information like demand perspectives for a firm’s products and 
competitors’ policies. This analysis will facilitate the coordination task between agents 
within the firm like workers (Haltiwanger and Maccini, 1994) or between different divisions 
like marketing and production (Nie and Young, 1997), in order to define a well-grounded 
strategy1. Considering only the first part of the compensation scheme, inventory cost 
reductions in the short-term cannot be drastic, because this would hinder the achievement of 
relevant reductions in inventory costs in the future (opportunistic behavior). However, the 
compensation for managerial efforts not devoted to operational activities would justify drastic 
reductions in inventory costs. This is because the latter earnings may offset the expected future 
losses that an initial drastic inventory cost reduction brings about. To achieve such an 
                                                             
1 Throughout the paper, we are going to refer to these efforts as managerial efforts that are considered not 
directly related to inventory management. 
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outcome an Operations Manager should combine intensive efforts to reduce inventory costs 
with low managerial efforts in the first period. This allows a greater possibility for future 
compensation linked to improvements in these latter efforts that can offset the reduction in 
future compensation related to inventory costs reduction. Thus, through this mechanism, the 
firm’s owner can use monitoring of Operations Managers behavior in implementing these non-
inventory related efforts (reduction in agency costs) as a way to influence inventory cost 
reductions. 
 Paradoxically, by incorporating compensation from increases in these managerial 
efforts, we find that inventory costs are reduced, and a steady-state inventory level is reached, 
in a shorter period of time than by compensating only on inventory cost reductions. 
We can extract several conclusions from our paper. Firstly, firms can try to stimulate 
the managerial role of their Operations Managers without giving up inventory-efficient 
management. The correct design of the compensation package can make both objectives 
compatible. Interestingly, our point is that this scheme also works when these alternative tasks 
have even no relationship with inventory management and when Operations Managers have 
large incentives to behave opportunistically. Secondly, long-serving Operations Managers 
with additional non-inventory responsibilities may fix inventories at their optimal level in a 
shorter period of time than recently-appointed managers without these responsibilities. Once 
that inventory level has been reached, there is no further inventory variability. Consequently, 
this variability in the medium-term is smoother in those firms with long-serving Operations 
Manager in comparison with those firms with newly appointed managers (Alfaro and Tribó, 
2003). Thirdly, firms with expertise in monitoring managers should handle inventories more 
efficiently. Lastly, if we consider the management of manpower levels as an Operations 
Manager’s responsibility, we can conclude that Operations Managers may manipulate 
workforce levels as a complementary mechanism to achieve lower inventory variability than 
by only managing inventories. This is in accordance with other studies (Haltiwanger and 
Maccini, 1994). 
This paper is divided into six sections. In the second section we build up the model, 
which is solved in the third section. We discuss the main theoretical findings in the fourth 
section. Section five inspects possible extensions of the model. The paper concludes with 
some final remarks. 
2/ THE MODEL 
This is a two-period model, with an Operations Manager (OM henceforth) of a 
representative firm deciding inventory policy as well as implementing some non-verifiable 
managerial efforts. Firm’s owner monitors these efforts to compensate the OM contingent on 
them. The model is based on the following assumptions: 
Assumptions 
1/ The firm faces demand tt DD e+= , where [ ] { }, 0E and De e e e eÎ = £  (to 
avoid a negative demand, that is D  is large enough). These e  are deviations from the mean 
and are known at the end of each period. They are independent and uniformly distributed with 
a zero mean value.  These deviations allow us to abstract from issues related to the demand 
structure and its impact on firms’ inventory policy. Similar demand consideration can be 
found in Khan (1991), although this paper does not specify the distribution of demand shocks2. 
                                                             
2 The adoption of a non-uniform, but symmetric distribution would have generated qualitatively the same type 
of results. The main difference is that the comparative static analysis would have been more dependent on the 
initial conditions over total inventory costs. 
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2/ Total Inventory Cost (TC) per period is defined as the sum of the costs associated 
with filling customers’ orders, the cost of carrying inventories and the stockout costs3. An 
expression of this function 4 is: 
Q
SQ
c
Q
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c
Q
D
cTC rhf 2
)(
2
22 -
++= qq         (1) 
Where: fc  = Filling cost per order; D = Total demand per period; hc  = Unitary inventory 
holding cost; rc = Unitary inventory stockout cost; S = Inventory level; Q = Lot size; q  = 
Planning period (if we take it as 1 we accommodate planning period with demand one). 
In each period, a firm faces a demand that arrives at a continuous rate and, at the end of 
the period, total demand comes out to be tD . Besides, we assume, in order to simplify, that 
demand is attended with constant lots with a Q size. We can think of the existence of some 
technological constraints to justify this assumption5. 
3/ An OM is risk neutral and has a two-period temporal horizon6. The compensation is 
defined as follows (we implicitly assume a zero discount rate): 
))(( 11 -- -+-+= ttttt eekTCTCw ba        (2) 
By notation, wt is the period-t wage that it is composed of two parts: a fixed part, a , 
which is high enough7, and a variable part. The variable part has two terms. First term 
)( 1 tt TCTC --  measures the decrease in the total inventory costs between period t-1, 1-tTC , 
and period t, tTC . The second term, 1-- tt ee  measures the increase in the observed 
managerial effort (see next assumption) between period t-1, 1-te , and period t, te
8. With this 
kind of scheme, the firm’s owner gives OMs incentives to reduce inventory costs as well as to 
increase managerial effort, e 9. 
                                                             
3 Inventory carrying cost 
Q
S
ch 2
2
q  is the average cost of holding inventories between different lots of 
production considering a uniform demand. Stockout cost 
Q
SQ
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)( 2-
q  is the cost of not attending a uniform 
demand (negative inventory) between different lots of production. 
4 We have decided to work with (1) because, although the demand includes a stochastic part, the random noise 
is uniformly distributed, and, on average, total cost function can be characterized by this function once we 
substitute the demand for its mean value.  
5 To consider an endogenous lots size does not bring about relevant new insights. 
6 If we had added an additional period, the main difference would have been that the first period solution 
would have been more complex and, in general the reduction in inventory costs would have been less drastic. 
In general, the larger the number of periods in the model, the smoother the inventory policy. 
7 This a  should be high enough to avoid situations of negative wages if the OM has not achieved an inventory 
cost reduction and has not increased managerial effort. 
8 Note that this managerial effort is not observable and can only be inferred from a signal that can be 
measured in cardinal terms after the implementation of some monitoring (-see next assumption). This signal 
is the output generated which is a standard assumption in agency theory (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
Moreover, we have assumed, for simplicity, that this output is proportional (with a factor K) to the effort e. 
The larger the effort e, the more skilled is the manager in defining a successful strategy generating tangible 
results. Note also that parameter k controls the relative weight for the OM’s compensation for managerial 
effort in comparison with inventory cost reduction, which will allow us to conduct some comparative static 
analysis in later sections.  
9 An alternative incentive scheme to compensate overall effort, e, in each period instead of the differences in 
these efforts, introduces an asymmetry with regard to the proposed scheme that compensates the reduction in 
inventory costs. In any case, this alternative incentive scheme would produce more pronounced positive 
effects of managerial efforts on inventory cost reduction.  
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4/ Owners only observe managerial effort e if they implement a monitoring intensity, 
M10. In particular, we follow what is established as standard in the agency theory literature 
(e.g. Diamond, 1991); monitoring intensity defines the probability of detecting effort e 
inferred from the output that this effort generates11. Finally, for the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that this monitoring intensity is exogenously given with the same value in both 
periods12. 
5/ The OM can implement managerial effort, e, with a cost given by the function C[e] 
that satisfies '( ) 0 '( 0) 0 ''( ) 0C e C e and C e> = = > . Moreover, we separate the cost related 
to these efforts from those efforts devoted to operational activities. Hence, we do not force 
ex-ante the interaction between operational and managerial efforts by assuming 
complementarities/substatibilities in the effort cost function. Moreover, the efforts devoted to 
the definition of an inventory policy are observable (see footnote 10) and can be fixed ex-ante 
in a contract. This justifies their exclusion from the maximization program solved by an OM. 
6/ An OM can be fired at the end of the first period, if he or she has not created net 
value. In this case, to simplify, firing costs are assumed to be zero. Thus, the ex-ante 
probability of an OM’s continuation, pc, equals the probability of observing that an OM has 
created value. This can be achieved by reducing TC, or by increasing managerial effort, e. 
Therefore, pc is defined as: 
)0()1()0)(( 100110 >--+>-+-= TCTCprobMeekTCTCMprobpc  
This is the sum of two terms. First, the (M) probability of knowing effort, e, times the 
probability of an increase in the observed value generated by the OM (including e). Second, 
the probability (1-M) of not knowing effort, e, times the probability of an increase in the value 
generated by the OM due to the reduction in inventory costs. 
The OM knows the probability, pc, which means that the monitoring intensity 
implemented by the owner is known. We justify such an assumption because the OM can infer 
M from the pressures exerted by the principal in order to determine managerial effort e. 
Time-line of the Model 
0/ The OM simultaneously determines first-period inventory level, 1S , as well as first-
period effort 1e . To do so, he or she takes into consideration his or her expectation of future 
demand realizations as well as the owner’s monitoring intensity M. 
1/ First-period demand realization 1 1D D e= +  is known at the end of that period. OM 
receives the wage and continues in the firm if enough value is generated. If not, the OM is 
fired and a new one is hired. 
2/ The OM defines second-period inventory policy as well as second-period effort. To 
do so he or she takes into consideration first-period total inventory costs, TC1, first-period 
effort, e1, as well as his or her expectation of second-period demand realizations.  
3/ Last-period demand is realized, and the OM receives his or her payments. 
                                                             
10 The lack of observability for this effort conforms to the idea that they are not operational and that they are 
embedded in the definition of the overall company strategy. Given the intangible nature of these efforts, 
which is in sharp contrast with the mechanical nature of the operational ones, it is quite natural to assume that 
managerial “strategic” efforts are not observable without monitoring whereas operational ones are. 
11 Some authors like Repullo and Suarez (2004) consider that the probability of knowing effort, e, depends 
not only on monitoring intensity M, but also on effort e. We abstract from these issues given that our focus is 
not on the interaction between monitoring efforts and strategic efforts but on the effect of the latter on 
inventory management. 
12  By allowing M to be endogenous would have introduced technical complexities without giving new 
insights into the connection between effort, e, and inventory cost reduction. 
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3/ SOLVING THE MODEL 
We solve the model backwards. Thus, we first characterize second-period OM 
decisions. Then, we move to the first period. 
Second-period Problem 
At t=2, an OM determines second-period inventory level, 2S , as well as second-
period managerial effort, e2. The maximization problem to solve is the following: 
{ } [ ] [ ][ ]
[ ][ ]212212
2211221222,
)()(
))(1())((
22
eCeeMkTCTCE
eCTCTCMeekTCTCMEwEMax eS
--+-+=
=---+-+-+º
bba
bba
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Where, 2e , can only be observed with a probability which is given by owner’s 
monitoring intensity (M). 
First Order Conditions (FOC) of the previous problem leads to13: 
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-=¶ qq        (4) 
{ } [ ] [ ]*2*222e ' 0' w2 eCMkeCMkE =Þ=-=¶ bb         (4’) 
We can see that increases in M and/or k lead to increases in second-period effort 2e  
due to C’’>0. Note also, that effort 2e  depends on Mb  factor. Either an increase in the 
incentive intensity, b , and/or in the monitoring intensity, M, can be used as substitute 
mechanisms to stimulate second-period OM efforts, 2e . In words of Chang and Lai (1999) 
“there is a trade-off between the wage (carrot) incentive and the supervision (stick) 
incentive”. 
First-period Problem  
At t=0, OM determines first-period inventory, 1S , and first-period effort, 1e , taking 
into consideration the optimal solution found in the second period. The problem the OM 
solves is the following ( 0E  stands for period-zero expectations): 
{ } [ ][ ]11*2*2101100, )))((())((11 eCeeMkTCTCpeeMkTCTCEMax ceS --+-++-+-+ baba  
S.t. [ ] [ ]*2*2*2*2 ',ˆ)( eCMkandSTCTCSQcc
c
S
rh
r ==º
+
= b  
By re-arranging this expression and neglecting constant terms, we can transform the 
previous maximization problem into minimization of the following objective function ( 1O ): 
{ } { } [ ]1*2110*2011010, ))(()(11 eCeeMkTCETCEpMkeTCEOEMin ceS +--+-+-= b
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13 Second order conditions are satisfied straightforwardly. 
14 The expression of cp  is obtained using the assumption made that error term e  follows a uniform 
distribution. 
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First order conditions lead to (see point 1 in the Appendix): 
{ } )('O 110e1 eCkTME +-=¶ b         (6) 
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The solution of this problem leads to an equilibrium that depends on the value of: 
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With *2ˆ eandS  given in (4) and (4’) respectively. 
 
Proposition 1  
The optimal inventory policy is defined in terms of T given in (8): 
a) If ( ) 0ˆ,,0ˆ 21*221 <====º SSSeeeTT  
0),,,(ˆ)('0 1
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b) If 0ˆ >T , in that case the equilibrium is given by: 
)ˆ,,(ˆ)(')(' 21
*
2
*
1
**
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
* SSSeeTTwithSSSeCkMeCkTM ==º==== bb  
Proof 
See point 2 in the Appendix. 
4/ DISCUSSION 
Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium inventory level, Sˆ , as well as its associated TC, 
is achieved in a single period when the OM implements some managerial efforts in the first 
period. On the contrary, when he or she exercises no effort in the initial period, the steady-
state equilibrium is not achieved until the second period. Obviously, in the former situation, in 
comparison with the latter, there is no inventory variability between period one and period 
two. Also, from this equilibrium, we obtain that once the steady-state inventory level, Sˆ , is 
achieved, there is a drastic increase of managerial efforts from *111 0 eetoe == . 
Remarkably, whenever 0TC  is high, important reductions in TC are required and, the 
compensation scheme must favor managerial efforts, e, in order to make the 00ˆ 1 >Û> eT  
outcome more likely. A natural way to achieve this is by raising k (the relative weight of the 
managerial effort in the compensation scheme). Specifically, expression (8) shows that when 
there is an important reduction in first-period total inventory cost ( 101 TCTC -=D  high), there 
is also a significant decrease in the T value, which, in turn, also decreases -by (6) and C’’>0- 
first-period effort, 1e . The logic of this result is that a remarkable reduction of 1TC  
generates limited second-period OM gains because of reductions in TC ( 21 TCTC - ) are 
more difficult to achieve when 1TC  is low. A way to offset these diminished revenues is by 
reducing first-period effort 1e , because this opens the possibility of substantial second-period 
OM gains linked to managerial effort ( )( 12 eek -  may be high when 1e  is low). Thus, 
increasing OM effort compensation with a high k, favors the possibility of steep inventory cost 
reduction in the first period. This is stated in the following Proposition. 
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Proposition 2 
OM compensation for managerial efforts allows for significant reductions in inventory-
related costs so as to achieve the optimal long-term inventory level in a short period of 
time. This generates, in future periods, a reduced variation in a firm’s inventory level. 
Proof 
Follows directly from Proposition 1. 
This result may justify a firm’s policy of promoting the managerial role of OMs. In that 
case OMs try to reduce TC to achieve the optimal level in a single period and after that, they 
focus on increasing managerial efforts. This describes a pattern of OMs’ behavior that should 
be tested empirically. 
Interestingly, these efforts, as we stated in the introduction, may be completely 
unrelated to inventory management. In fact, we are assuming this to be true, otherwise, the 
compensation scheme perceived by OMs would rely exclusively on reductions in an 
“amplified” total inventory cost function, as we discuss in the next section. Note also that by 
requiring some monitoring for verification, we assume implicitly that these managerial efforts 
are of a different nature to those implemented in the definition of inventory management (these 
latter efforts do not require any monitoring).  
An example of these managerial efforts, although to some degree related with 
inventory management, is labor hiring. Some authors show that in case of high demand shocks 
variability, an OM with both responsibilities may decide to use worker turnover to smooth 
inventory variability (Haltiwanger and Maccini, 1994). In our model, high demand variability 
(high e ) makes the 0ˆ >T  outcome in (9) more probable. This leads to the equilibrium with 
non-null managerial effort (i.e. labor hiring effort) and smoother inventory policy. 
Proposition 1 also allows describing those scenarios with high inventory variability in 
the medium term as we define it. This is the difference between second-period inventory level 
and the first-period one. Basically, this analysis relies on the inspection of the expression of 
Tˆ  when 0ˆ <T , 15 which can be rearranged (see point 3 in the appendix) as: 
[ ] [ ])()ˆ((2ˆ 1010 STCESTCEc
Q
T
f
-
D
=
e
       (10) 
Thus, a more negative Tˆ  means an increase in the difference between S  (first-period 
inventories) and Sˆ  (second-period inventories). This will lead to an increase in inventory 
variability16. 
Also, expression Tˆ  in (9) and (10) allows making a comparative static analysis with 
regard to structural parameters like kMTC ,,, 0b
a . This defines the following Proposition. 
Proposition 3 
When the fixed portion of the OM compensation is larger than the variable part (
b
a  high); 
and/or the owner’s monitoring intensity is large enough (M large); and/or effort incentive 
scheme is high enough (k high) and/or the initial inventory costs are not very high ( 0TC  
low), three consequences follow. Firstly, there is a sharp reduction in inventory TC and the 
steady-state level is achieved in a single period. Secondly, inventory policy is quite stable 
in the medium term, and lastly, OM implements managerial efforts during the initial 
period. 
                                                             
15 The case of 0ˆ ³T  leads to null inventory variability. 
16 To try to smooth this variability is relevant because at a macroeconomic level up to 87% of GDP variance 
during short-term recessions is linked with drastic inventory reductions (Blinder and Maccini, 1991). 
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Proof 
Directly by inspecting Tˆ  and making use of the result of Proposition 1. 
 This proposition describes different mechanisms that can lead to a medium-term 
inventory variability that is low when an owner tries to reduce inventory costs. Firstly, the 
design of compensation scheme that combines a high fixed part with large payments for OM 
managerial effort (high k). Second, an intensive monitoring (high M) of OM managerial 
efforts. This leads to some testable predictions like a lower inventory variability in those 
firms owned by banks (recognized as specialists in monitoring), in comparison with those 
owned by non-banks (Tribó, 2006). 
This model also predicts that whenever initial TC is high and, eventually, a new OM is 
hired to deal with this situation, an OM implements no managerial efforts and focuses mainly 
on reducing inventory TC. On the other hand, when a long-tenure OM is in charge, generally, 
he/she is also involved in non inventory-related activities. These OMs have developed the 
required skills to carry out other responsibilities not directly related to inventories. In that 
case, our model shows that by receiving good incentives, these OMs are able to: reduce 
inventory TC to a greater extent; ensure a convergence to the steady-state inventory level in a 
shorter period of time; and define a smoother inventory policy. This result is consistent with 
some empirical studies that compare inventory variability between firms with long-tenure 
OMs and those with recently-appointed ones (Alfaro and Tribó, 2003). 
As a final comment, we can integrate in our analysis factors related to firm’s market 
structure as well as the characteristics of the goods that a firm produces. As a first 
approximation, we can consider that a high (low) value of rc  may represent mainly 
competitive (monopolistic) markets, while a high (low) value of hc  may be linked to 
perishable (perennial) goods. Simple inspection of Tˆ  in (9) reveals that 0
ˆ
0
ˆ
>
¶
¶
>
¶
¶
hr c
T
and
c
T . 
Thus, from this point of view, the more competitive the markets and/or the more perishable the 
goods traded, the more likely are those features linked to the 0ˆ >T  equilibrium: drastic TC 
reduction in the short-term and low inventory variability in the medium term. However, this 
result relies also on the value of 0TC , which depends not only on the initial conditions of the 
firm but also on the market structure and the type of goods. 
5/ EXTENSIONS 
 This model can be extended in two ways in order to reinforce our conclusions. 
 One possibility is to consider that OM has to achieve an objective total cost ( oTC ). 
From that level, OM is compensated (penalized) for any further reductions (increases). To be 
more realistic, we can assume that the principal (entrepreneur) does not know exactly what 
the optimal level to be accomplished by the OM should be (asymmetric information). In this 
case, a solution for the principal is to update this optimal level, taking as reference the 
reductions in TC that OM has achieved in the previous period. Formally: 
)(1 i
o
i
o
i
o
i TCTCTCTC --=+ d , where 10 ££ d  
17. In this case, 1=d  means that the reduction in the 
total cost achieved by the OM is a complete indication of what the objective TC function 
should be in the next period (there is a full information updating). On the contrary, 0=d  means 
that the objective TC is the same for both periods. Interestingly, when there is information 
updating ( 1®d ), the OM compensation scheme coincides with that of the model. Note that 
12 TCTC
o ®  as 1®d . In this case, OM compensation is: 
                                                             
17 By penalizing appropriately increases in the TC from the objective level, we prevent OM from behaving 
opportunistically by setting a high TC in the previous period in order to induce the entrepreneur to fix an 
achievable objective  TC function in the present one. 
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 More specifically, there exists a threshold value 1ˆ0 << d  such that for dd ˆ>  the 
equilibrium in inventory and effort levels is of the type given in Proposition 1 and all the 
analysis made throughout the paper applies. However, when dd ˆ< , only the equilibrium with 
low inventory variability and significant TC reduction exists. Interestingly, in this latter 
situation strong first-period TC reductions do not preclude OM from implementing significant 
first-period effort, 1e , as we have found in our model. Conversely, large first-period OM 
efforts do not hinder first-period TC reductions that characterize the so-called good-
equilibrium. In this case, the beneficial effects of managerial efforts are even greater than in 
our model as there is less need to give up substantial first-period managerial efforts to 
achieve a strong first-period inventory TC reduction. In particular, the marginal loss in the 
compensation for inventory cost reduction is proportional to ( 1)1( ed+ ). When d  is low, 
implementing high managerial efforts has a limited detrimental effect on the OM’s 
compensation for reductions achieved in inventory costs. 
 Another extension is to consider that managerial efforts are exclusively linked to 
inventory management. For example, in the JIT approach the OM implements efforts to 
continuously improve the parameters of the existing cost function. In this case, there are 
different modeling possibilities. On the one hand, we can consider that these managerial 
efforts reduce TC function in an additive way, that is, 
i
i
r
i
h
i
fi KeQ
SQ
c
Q
S
c
Q
D
cTC -
-
++=
2
)(
2
22
qq . In this case, OM compensation based on reducing 
the overall TC from an objective TC level ( 1=d ) transforms to an equivalent function to 
expression (2) of the model:  
1 1 1 1( ( )) ( ( ))i i i i i i i i iw TC ke TC ke TC TC k e ea b a b- - - -= + - - - = + - + - . Hence, the analysis 
made throughout the paper applies. 
 On the other hand, there is an alternative that is to introduce these managerial efforts in 
a multiplicative way; for example, by reducing rhf ccc ,,  by a factor (1-e). In this case, the 
manager will implement low managerial efforts in the first period in order to make the 
objective TC function in the second period achievable. Then, in this latter period the OM will 
implement such efforts to ensure steep reduction in the TC and cash them in accordingly. 
Hence, this dynamic is quite similar to that described in our model, but in this case these 
managerial efforts are less beneficial for stimulating TC reductions. 
6/ CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we show that an Operations Manager (OM) who devotes some efforts to 
define a firm’s strategy may outperform an OM exclusively devoted to inventory management 
because the latter has more incentive to behave opportunistically. This is achieved by 
implementing a compensation scheme that rewards inventory cost reductions as well as the 
increase in other value-generating managerial efforts. With such a scheme, an OM has 
incentives to reduce significantly inventory costs in the short-term although this lowers the 
possibility to cut inventory costs in the future. Thus, an OM will only have incentives to make 
such reductions if these future losses are offset with other gains. These may be achieved by 
rewarding managerial efforts adequately. 
According to the proposed incentive scheme, we conclude the following OMs 
behavior. In the first period, OMs devote more efforts to reduce inventory costs than to their 
managerial responsibilities. However, when the steady-state inventory level is reached, the 
managerial component of the OM efforts linked to strategic tasks is more important. Thus, 
paradoxically, by combining both types of efforts, there is an intense inventory cost reduction 
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in the short-term that drives the firm’s inventory level to its steady-state value. This may not 
be true when an OM only manages firm’s inventory. In this case he or she behaves 
strategically and avoids sharp reductions in inventory costs in the short-term because this 
would hinder future reductions in these costs. 
Our analysis also highlights different features. Firstly, in an efficiently design contract 
framework, when we compare firms with long-serving OMs with those recently appointed, a 
smoother medium-term inventory variation is expected in the former in comparison with the 
latter. Secondly, our model has some relationship with those models that compare centralized 
versus non-centralized inventory decision-making. An OM with managerial and operations 
responsibilities forms part of a highly centralized decision-making framework. In that case our 
result of lower inventory variability value in comparison with less centralized frameworks 
coincides with Matsuura and Tsubone (1993). Thirdly, those firms with an OM involved in an 
increasing amount of additional responsibilities need not be concerned about their lack of 
focus. The appropriate design of the compensation package based, paradoxically, on relevant 
payments for those non-inventory related activities could overcome all these problems. This 
result is consistent with some common features of behavioral theory: In a context with 
information asymmetries, due to uncertainty, investment variability may be reduced once we 
have designed an efficient compensation scheme that weights variables that are sufficiently 
informative in capturing managerial behavior (non-inventory related efforts). This is a clear 
message that can be extracted from this paper: it is possible to shape the “natural” tendency of 
OMs to act as strategic managers, in a way that does not damage a firm’s inventory policy and 
even prevent them from behaving opportunistically on inventory management. 
Our model has some limitations that open new avenues for future research. This is a 
two-period static model that does not allow us to analyze the dynamics of the OM role within 
the firm. A dynamic model would open up the possibility to study issues of OM related to 
career concerns. We expect that in such a model, the OM would internalize their promotion 
possibilities which, in turn, would provide further incentives to exert managerial efforts. 
Hence, we expect the results of our model to be reinforced when dynamic effects are 
incorporated. Questions of information asymmetries are also ruled out for the sake of 
simplicity. However, although simple, our model conclusions are robust to different modeling 
alternatives. Also a set of empirical predictions concerning firms’ inventory variability 
emerges from our theoretical results. We expect lower inventory variability in those firms 
with: long-serving OMs (who carry out these managerial efforts); large fix-part managerial 
compensation; and efficiently monitoring (i.e. with banks as shareholders). Also, from our 
model we find that OM compensation is based mainly on inventory cost reduction in the short-
term and on managerial efforts in the medium-term. Finally, once we incorporate some 
additional questions of market microstructure, we get that in monopolistic markets with low 
unitary holding cost inventory variability is especially high. Empirically test these theoretical 
outcomes will be the subject of future research. 
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18 This is a second-order polynomial with a real solution when 0ˆ <T . This is the case because 
TSST ˆ)ˆ( 11 == and T  increases with 1S  for 11 SˆS > . Thus it will exist a 11 SˆS >  such that 0=T  
19  See assumption 5 for the cost function C. 
